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Abstract
The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) aims 
to achieve more effective, efficient and synergic military 
capabilities through a series of ad hoc projects. It is legally 
rooted in the EU Lisbon Treaty, yet it is substantially 
intergovernmental and much of its content and shape 
will be decided by the member states over the next 
few years. As with all institutional designs incorporating 
differentiated integration, the onset of PESCO begs the 
question of how this initiative relates to third countries 
that are not full members of the EU such as Norway, 
Turkey and – in the future - the UK. The modality of 
these countries’ involvement in PESCO directly impacts 
on the future of EU–NATO collaboration. In principle, 
this involvement could be achieved by granting NATO 
member third countries consultation rights in deciding 
on PESCO’s policy direction, and full participatory rights 
in PESCO’s capability and operational projects to which 
they can participate.
Introduction: 
What is PESCO and how does it work?
The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is the 
latest development in terms of European collaboration 
and, eventually, integration in the defence domain. It 
aims to achieve more effective, efficient and synergic 
military capabilities through a series of ad hoc projects 
on a number of military aspects. It is legally rooted in 
the EU Lisbon Treaty and features an important role for 
the Union’s High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), 
yet it is substantially intergovernmental and much of its 
content and shape will be decided by the member states 
over the next few years.
Following a reflection fuelled by the 2016 EU Global 
Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), PESCO 
was formally launched on December 2017 by 25 EU 
member states – all but Denmark, Malta and the UK.1 
PESCO envisages two layers of governance: a higher one, 
in which all participating member states are involved 
and decisions are taken by consensus; and a lower level 
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Paper presented at the seminar “PESCO and Security Cooperation 
between EU and Turkey”, organized in Berlin on 14 May 2018 by the 
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) and 
Stiftung Mercator under the Global Turkey in Europe V programme.
1 Council of the European Union, Defence cooperation: Council 
establishes Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with 25 
member states participating, 11 December 2017, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/11/
defence-cooperation-pesco-25-member-states-participating.
comprising specific projects. In the latter case, only those 
European countries committed to a certain project decide 
on its implementation, budget, developments, etc.
PESCO activates a Lisbon Treaty provision by establishing 
a legally binding framework deeply rooted in the EU’s 
institutional “landscape”. As such, it is qualitatively 
different from declarations favouring enhanced European 
defence cooperation put forward by European summits 
in recent years.2 Indeed, PESCO envisages binding and 
quite detailed commitments, coupled with accountability 
mechanisms such as national implementation plans and 
the annual report presented by the HR/VP. Also, single 
participating member states can be excluded from 
PESCO in the event of their non-compliance; although 
this constitutes a remote possibility, this risk of exclusion 
will probably put member states under pressure to fulfil 
their commitments.3
Moreover, EU institutions are strongly involved in PESCO 
in various ways. The HR/VP is fully committed – having, for 
instance, the aforementioned responsibility of overseeing 
the yearly evaluation of PESCO results. The European 
Defence Agency (EDA) acts as a PESCO secretariat 
together with the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
– including the EU Military Committee, which is tasked 
with supporting the initiative’s operational aspects. Such 
a legal and institutional framework constitutes another 
strength of PESCO, since it contributes to keeping the 
project on the EU political agenda and encourages 
further developments – as have occurred in a number of 
EU policy fields, including some in the defence sector as 
a result of the drafting and implementation of the EUGS.4
1. What are the challenges facing PESCO in 
the light of future scenarios?
The majority of the first batch of 17 projects endorsed 
within PESCO, in March 2018, has had little or no direct 
impact on the development of military capabilities – 
the focus being rather on education, training, military 
mobility, medical commands and a cyber-response team.5 
The five PESCO initiatives directly focused on capability 
development deal with the armoured infantry fighting 
vehicle, indirect fire support, maritime systems for mine 
countermeasures, harbour protection and the upgrading 
2 Alessandro Marrone, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: An 
Institutional Pathway for European Defence”, in IAI Commentaries, 
No. 17|26 (November 2017), http://www.iai.it/en/node/8508.
3 Tomáš Valášek, “The EU’s New Defense Pact: Marginal Gains”, 
in Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, 16 November 2017, http://
carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/74760.
4 On the whole EUGS process, see: Nathalie Tocci, Framing the EU 
Global Strategy. A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World, Cham, Springer-
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
5 Marcin Terlikowski, “PESCO: First Projects and the Search for (a 
Real) Breakthrough”, in PISM Bulletin, No. 65 = 1136 (8 May 2018), 
http://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/no-65-1136.
of maritime surveillance.6
Such a low-profile start has underlined to two main 
weaknesses of PESCO. The first one relates to its balance 
between ambitions and inclusiveness.7 This (im)balance 
was the result of intense negotiations in the run-up to the 
launch of PESCO. In particular, France pushed for more 
demanding commitments in order to make the initiative 
ambitious and relevant both for crisis-management 
operations and defence procurement – and therefore a 
means to achieve European strategic autonomy.8 To this 
end, Paris was happy to have only a few willing and able 
member states joining PESCO. Conversely, Berlin aimed for 
a more inclusive initiative, one that would not lead to new 
dividing lines in Europe, as a way of politically reaffirming 
European unity and the viability of the EU integration 
process vis-à-vis Brexit (Britain’s intended exit from the EU) 
and anti-EU forces within and beyond the Union – a view 
that was also appreciated by Brussels institutions. The 
resulting balance is clearly closer to Berlin’s stance than 
that of Paris. However, inclusiveness came with a price. 
If an initiative like PESCO, designed for a core group of 
member states very close to each other in political and 
military terms, is implemented through the participation 
of 25 national governments there is a risk of diminishing 
its effectiveness, efficiency and ambitions – for example, 
because of the unanimity voting system required at the 
higher level of governance.
It is not by chance that, as mentioned above, the first wave 
of 17 projects has, by mobilizing only modest resources, 
disappointed those expecting a breakthrough in terms 
of defence cooperation and integration. Actually, much 
has depended – and will depend – on the political will of 
major European countries and the actual determination 
of others to follow up on their commitments. Noticeably, 
France and Germany are not participating in any of the 
five PESCO projects more directly related to capability 
development, and have limited their involvement in the 
others in comparison with a strong commitment from, for 
example, Italy and Spain. In parallel, Berlin and Paris have 
relaunched bilateral cooperation with their July 2017 
joint proposal for a number of cooperative procurement 
efforts.9 As a whole, it seems to be the case that PESCO 
has not been used thus far for the most ambitious level of 
6 Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 
of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects to be developed 
under PESCO, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018D0340.
7 On the level of ambitions of PESCO commitments, see among 
others: Olivier De France, Claudia Major and Paola Sartori, “How 
to Make PeSCo a Success”, in Ares Group Policy Papers, No. 21 
(September 2017), http://www.iris-france.org/notes/how-to-make-
pesco-a-success.
8 Alessandro Marrone, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: An 
Institutional Pathway for European Defence”, cit.
9 Alessandro Riccardo Ungaro, “Gli assi (fuori) dalla manica di 
Francia e Germania”, in AffarInternazionali, 23 July 2017, http://
www.affarinternazionali.it/?p=65772.
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capability development by those counties able to invest 
in such projects.
One of the reasons for this lack of commitment in the 
initial phase lies exactly in the fact that the launch of a 
very inclusive PESCO raised doubts about its ambition 
and effectiveness – in Paris as well as in other capitals in 
Western Europe. France has indeed continued to work on 
bilateral deals on defence cooperation with other major 
European countries. On January 2018, France and the UK 
concluded the Sandhurst Agreement in the wake of the 
2010 Lancaster House Treaty, according to which:
1. a UK–France Defence Ministerial Council will be 
established;
2. the UK will continue to participate in European 
defence research and capability-development 
programmes; and
3. the UK is allowed to support the synergic deployment 
of European troops through the French-led European 
Intervention Initiative (EI2).10
The EI2, involving another nine European countries,11 aims 
to joint military forces and common funding as well as 
developing a common strategic culture as a precondition 
for effectively coordinating the use of military forces.12 
Actually, the EI2 may contribute to fragmenting European 
cooperation in the defence field by introducing a PESCO-
like mechanism opened to non-EU countries and those 
outside the Union’s institutional framework.13 Regarding 
fragmentation and bilateral deals, the aforementioned 
Sandhurst Agreement is part of a renewed French effort 
to enhance and deepen bilateral cooperation with other 
European countries, as proven by the initiative to sign a 
“Quirinale Treaty” with Italy by the end of 2018, along the 
lines of the 1963 Élysée Treaty with Germany.14
In this context, any future development of PESCO will 
largely depend on whether and how it will be related 
to bilateral and mini-lateral cooperation between 
European countries. This could represent a win–win 
situation whereby, for example, bilateral formats act as 
10 UK Ministry of Defence, UK and France Commit to New Defence 
Cooperation, 18 January 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/uk-and-france-commit-to-new-defence-cooperation.
11 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK.
12 Fabrice Pothier, “Macron’s European Vision”, in The Survival 
Editors’ Blog, 9 October 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-
blog/2017/10/macron-europe.
13 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “France Moves From EU 
Defense to European Defense”, in Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, 7 
December 2017, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/74944.
14 Jérôme Gautheret, “A Rome, Macron fait l’éloge de Gentiloni 
à moins de deux mois des élections italiennes”, in Le Monde, 11 
January 2018, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2018/01/11/
a-rome-macron-fait-l-eloge-de-gentiloni-a-moins-de-deux-mois-
des-elections-italiennes_5240610_3214.html. The Quirinale is the 
Rome hill hosting the residence and office of the Italian Republic’ 
President.
“incubators” of cooperative projects to be opened up 
to other participants in the PESCO framework in order 
to pool and share the resources of willing and able 
countries in a transparent manner. Or, the current status 
quo of fragmentation, poor coordination, and un-useful 
duplication of efforts and initiatives at various levels and 
in different formats could be allowed to continue.
PESCO’s future development will be also influenced by its 
relations with other recent EU initiatives in the defence 
domain. First in line would be the European Defence 
Fund (EDF), launched by the European Commission 
in 2016, which finances military research (90 million 
euro in 2017–19) and co-finances the development of 
defence capabilities (500 million euro in 2019–20).15 The 
proposal for the next multiannual financial framework 
2021-2027 see 4,1 billion euro for research and 8,9 
billion euro for capability development over seven years. 
PESCO participating member states (pMS) are obviously 
interested in gaining access to such financing. The 
Commission has decided that the EDF will co-finance 
20 per cent of the cost of development and acquisition 
projects outside PESCO, and 30 per cent of the cost 
of projects within it; a 10 per cent increase for joint 
programmes worth hundreds of millions of euros is a 
significant quantitative incentive for pMS to embark on 
cooperative projects within PESCO.16
The other recent and relevant EU initiative is the 
Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), designed 
to share and regularly assess the military planning of the 
Union’s member states at the level of national ministers 
of defence, in order to better identify capability gaps 
and potential for cooperation on future procurement 
programmes – with the EDA again acting as secretariat. 
In launching PESCO, pMS have committed to supporting 
CARD “to the maximum extent possible”,17 which in turn 
would strengthen PESCO itself by pressuring national 
governments to align their military requirements 
and plans, and invest in cooperative procurement 
programmes.
Taken together, the PESCO politico-institutional 
framework, the ministerial assessment conducted under 
CARD and the EDF’s relevant EU resources for military 
research and procurement all represent an important 
pathway for increased defence cooperation and 
integration within the Union. As with every such pathway, 
it can be taken or not – and further steps forward can be 
15 European Commission, Launching the European Defence Fund 
(COM/2017/295), 7 June 2017, p. 4-5, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52017DC0295.
16 Alessandro Marrone, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: An 
Institutional Pathway for European Defence”, cit.
17 Annex II to PESCO notification, point 7. See Joint notification 
by member states to the High Representative and to the Council on 
PESCO, 13 November 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf.
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relatively fast and large or slow and small, depending on 
the will of those actors willing and able to undertake the 
journey. At the very least, once the whole mechanism is 
fully in place it will represent a “trigger” for national actors 
– armed forces, ministries of foreign affairs and defence 
industries – to consider opportunities for cooperation. 
The fact that the process is reiterated on a regular basis 
provides, over the years, the opportunity to channel their 
efforts through PESCO, and potentially to open it up to 
third countries such as Turkey – to which issue we now 
turn.
2. Third-country involvement in PESCO, 
and relations with Turkey
In accordance with Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), PESCO is established by “those member 
states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding commitments to one 
another in this area with a view to the most demanding 
missions”. Thus, in terms of institutional design, PESCO 
constitutes an exemplary case of differentiated 
integration, whereby only member states that are willing 
and able can join. In this sense, it is similar to the Eurozone 
and the Schengen regime, in which not all EU member 
states are involved. Yet, as with all institutional designs 
incorporating differentiated integration, the onset of 
PESCO begs the question of how this initiative will relate 
to third countries that are not full members of the EU. The 
question becomes all the more pressing in the context 
of PESCO given the complexity of the security threats 
that Europe is currently facing, which often defy the 
internal-external distinction. These range from Islamic 
fundamentalism to right-wing populism and the vastness 
of the geographical area covering China and Russia as 
well as the Middle East and Africa, from where external 
security threats to Europe emanate. Both the complexity 
and the scope of these threats necessitate that the EU 
employ feasible and effective mechanisms in integrating 
key third countries in its future defence initiatives within 
the scope of PESCO.
Cooperation between PESCO and third countries is an 
area that remains overlooked in the present arrangement. 
The current set-up stipulates that member states may 
invite third countries to take part in projects to which 
they can bring “substantial added value […], contribute 
to strengthening PESCO and the CSDP [Common 
Security and Defence Policy] and meet more demanding 
commitments”,18 but that these third countries do not 
have decision-making rights. Hence, while leaving the 
door open to third country involvement, in line with the 
“all but the institutions” dictum of the EU, this provision 
runs the risk of hampering any substantial cooperation 
with third parties in a field in which flexible integration 
applies. Such a rule implies that the EU may lose out 
18 Ibid., p. 8.
on any meaningful input by key third countries that 
otherwise play significant roles in matters concerning 
European security and defence. It also ensures that 
third-country defence companies would be excluded 
from capability projects. This understanding excludes 
countries such as Norway, which is a key player in conflict 
resolution and mediation; the UK, which is a strong 
policy actor and one of the largest contributors to CSDP 
military missions with a wide geographic outreach; and 
Turkey, which is a key partner in counterterrorism and a 
regional pivot in the Middle East and the Balkans with a 
growing presence in Africa. Yet, the exclusionary nature 
of EU defence cooperation is expected to be much more 
pronounced in the case of Turkey since – unlike Norway 
and, possibly, the post-Brexit UK – it does not enjoy any 
official links with the EDA, which would otherwise enable 
it to participate in EDA projects and programmes.
The modality of these countries’ involvement in PESCO 
additionally directly impacts on the future of EU–NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) collaboration, which 
also remains unclear under the PESCO arrangements. 
Although it is clear that, especially from the US 
perspective, PESCO could be perceived as an important 
step towards burden sharing in the security field, tighter 
coordination between the EU and NATO – particularly 
concerning capability planning – will be necessary to 
avoid leaving member states having to face competing 
expectations from both sides. As underlined by HR/VP 
Federica Mogherini, complementarity rather than conflict 
should define the EU–NATO relationship following the 
adoption of PESCO. Yet, effective EU–NATO collaboration, 
now also driven by the establishment of PESCO in 
addition to increasing security imperatives, also hinges 
on successful security collaboration between the EU and 
non-EU member NATO states. This is best demonstrated 
through the EU’s relationship with Turkey.
EU–NATO relations entered a severe impasse in relation 
to the contested role of Cyprus in EU–NATO cooperation 
after its EU membership in 2004. Turkey vetoed the 
signing of a security agreement between NATO and 
Cyprus, which would have led to Cyprus’ inclusion in 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and thus to its inclusion 
in EU–NATO cooperation. Meanwhile, Cyprus vetoed 
the EU–Turkey Security Agreement on the exchange of 
classified material between the two sides, and Turkish 
membership of the EDA. This double veto has, in effect, 
led to the freezing of the EU–NATO dialogue and prevents 
any substantial collaborative operation between the two 
parties.
The EU–NATO joint declaration adopted in Warsaw in 
2016, where Turkey chose not to exercise its veto power, 
re-launched hopes for cooperation and intensified the 
strategic partnership amid rising security concerns on 
both fronts in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of 
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Crimea. Yet, it remains unclear how this cooperation will 
move forward given the “frozen” nature of the Cyprus 
conflict, with no prospect of resolution in sight. Indeed, 
disputes over gas in the Levant are further exacerbating 
relations between Turkey and Cyprus, as well as fostering 
instability in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, 
Turkey’s bilateral relations with Greece, which is also a 
PESCO member, are also deteriorating – especially since 
1 March 2018, when two Greek soldiers who had strayed 
across the Turkish border were detained by the Turkish 
authorities. The recent downturn in Turkey–Greece 
relations has been picked up by the EU and was discussed 
in a plenary meeting of the European Parliament in 
April 2018. This all feeds into a mutual distrust in the 
increasingly strained EU–Turkey relationship, in which 
both sides are looking for ways to come up with a more 
clearly defined strategic partnership given the fact that 
Turkish EU accession does not figure as a realistic option 
in the short to medium term.
3. The way forward?
Cyprus’ membership of PESCO, the escalation of bilateral 
disputes between Greece and Turkey, and the pressing 
need for the specification of EU–NATO collaboration 
modalities through PESCO at a time when the overall EU–
Turkey relationship is also stagnating all constitute causes 
of concern for the future of PESCO as well as for European 
security writ large. Yet, Turkey is rarely mentioned in 
debates over third-party involvement in PESCO, and the 
initiative does not figure in discussions on the current 
shape and the future of the EU–Turkey relationship. For 
instance, the Commission’s April 2018 report on Turkey 
makes no mention of PESCO under the section on foreign 
and security policy or elsewhere, and the initiative has thus 
far not been publicly raised in any EU–Turkey meetings 
or correspondence. However, specifying modalities that 
will allow for a meaningful and inclusive contribution to 
PESCO by NATO-member third parties – including, but not 
exclusive to, Turkey – may in fact play a key role in easing 
the EU–NATO impasse. In principle, and in the short to 
medium term, this could be achieved by granting NATO 
member third countries consultation rights in deciding 
on PESCO’s policy direction in the Council of Ministers 
and full participatory rights in PESCO’s capability and 
operational modules, through which defence-related 
projects will be implemented. Such participation could 
mainly be “performance-based”, in the sense that it 
would depend upon the extent of the financial and/or 
qualitative (such as intelligence-exchange and capability-
development) contributions made by third countries.19 
Given the fact that a treaty change to grant third countries 
decision-making powers in areas subject to differentiated 
integration such as PESCO is not probable in the near 
19 See also Nicole Koenig, “Four Options for EU-UK Defence 
Cooperation Post-Brexit”, in Jacques Delors Institute Berlin Blog, 7 
February 2018, https://www.delorsinstitut.de/en/?p=9390.
future, this could be one way to break the impasse.
Cyprus – and now, due to increasingly strained ties, Greece 
– can be expected to veto this or similar arrangements 
where they concern the involvement of Turkey. Yet, it is 
also clear that neither country possesses the required 
military presence or the capabilities to participate in 
every PESCO module on which the member states will 
agree. Thus, it would be up to the pMS in the modules to 
agree on the inclusion of third countries in the projects 
to which they are contributing. While more operational 
PESCO projects would benefit from Turkish involvement, 
especially those that are geared towards the development 
and transfer of defence technology, they would overlap 
with Turkey’s own needs in this field.
This could be a realistic way to overcome the Cypriot 
veto and strengthen the European security complex 
by allowing a substantive contribution from Turkey as 
well as other NATO countries not belonging to the EU. 
Participating in nine out of thirty EU-led operations, 
Turkey has so far been the biggest contributor to 
European operations after France, Germany and Britain. 
Furthermore, this mechanism could provide a novel 
way to foster mutual trust between the EU and Turkey 
– and possibly contribute to breaking the vicious cycle 
of blockage with NATO. Perhaps most importantly, such 
meaningful inclusion could help to anchor Turkey in the 
European security framework at a time when the country’s 
commitment to NATO is increasingly being questioned.
Turkey currently seems to be struggling to strike a 
delicate balance between its relations with Russia and 
those with the West, which at times pits it against Europe 
in its foreign-policy choices – as was recently observed 
in its inaction following the Russian spy attack. Turkey’s 
decision to purchase a Russian-made S-400 missile system 
has also caused a great deal of international controversy 
over the country’s place in the Western security bloc, yet 
the fact that the very same country signed an agreement 
on 8 November 2017 with fellow NATO members 
France and Italy to develop its national air and missile 
defence systems attests to the available “space” through 
which Europe can engage more strongly with Turkey. 
Precisely because of Turkey’s domestic troubles, which 
are reflected in the volatility of its foreign- and security-
policy initiatives, novel forms of anchorage beyond the 
weakened accession framework are necessary for the 
sake of wider European security.
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